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Abstract
In this paper we consider the equal gain splittingrule and the split core. Both are
solution concepts for sequencing situationsand were introduced by Curiel, Pederzoli
and Tijs (1989) and Hamers, Suijs, Tijs and Borm (1994) respectively. Our goal is
a characterization of these solution concepts using consistency properties. However,
to do this we need a more subtle look at the allocations assigned by both solution
concepts. In the current deﬁnitions they assign aggregated allocations, i.e. only the
total reward is assigned to each agent. To use consistency in sequencing situations,
aggregated solution concepts do not provide sufﬁcient information. What we need
is a further speciﬁcation of this total reward of an agent. Therefore we introduce so
called non-aggregated solution concepts. A non-aggregated solution concept assigns
a vector to each agent, in some way representing the speciﬁcation of his total reward.
Consequently,a non-aggregated solutionconcept assignsto each sequencing situation
a matrix instead of a vector. In this paper we introduce the non-aggregated counter-
parts of the equal gain splitting rule and the split core and characterize them using
consistency.
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1 Introduction
Consistency properties arise in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. For
surveys we refer to Thomson (1990) and Driessen (1991) for the ﬁrst and Peleg and Tijs
(1992), Peleg, Potters and Tijs (1994) and Norde, Potters, Reijnierse and Vermeulen (1993)
for the latter. Roughly speaking, a solution concept is called consistent if renegotiation of
the subsolution by subcoalitions on the basis of the same solution concept applied to an
intuitively appealing reduced situation, will lead to the same suboutcome.
A property closely related to consistency is converse consistency. This property ap-
peared for the ﬁrst time in Peleg (1985) in characterizing the core. The main idea behind
converse consistency is the following. Given a situation on an agent set N and a solution
concept, if it is the case that the prescribed outcomes for the reduced situations on all
appropriate subsets of agents ﬁt in the sense that each player receives the same payoff in
each reducedsituationin whichheisinvolved,thecorrespondingpayoff(iffeasible)should
be prescribed by the solution concept for the original non-reduced situation.
For the class of combinatorial optimization situations consistency and/or converse
consistency has already appeared in assignment situations (Owen (1992)), ﬂow situations
(Reijnierse, Maschler, Potters and Tijs (1994)) and minimum cost spanning tree situations
(Feltkamp, Tijs and Muto (1994)). In this paper we deal with consistency properties of
solutions for one machine sequencing situations.
In one machine sequencing situations a ﬁnite number of agents are lined up in front
of a single machine, with each agent having exactly one job that has to be processed on
this machine. Further each agent incurs costs for every time unit he is in the system. One
problem arising from these situations is how to determine the processing order of the jobs
which minimizes total costs. This problem was solved by Smith (1956) in case all cost
functions are linear.
For the class of one machine sequencing situations Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989)
deﬁned combinatorial optimization games called sequencing games. Moreover, they intro-
duced the Equal Gain Splitting (EGS) rule, which assigns to each sequencing situation a
vector that is in the core of the corresponding sequencing game. They characterized this
rule using an efﬁciency, dummy, switch and equivalence property.
The split core, introduced by Hamers, Suijs, Tijs and Borm (1994), is a generalization
of the EGS rule and assigns to each sequencing situation a non-empty subset of the core
of the corresponding sequencing game. They provide a characterization of the split core
using efﬁciency, the dummy property and a kind of monotonicity.
In this paper we give characterizations of the EGS rule and the split core using certain
consistency properties. However,to achievethese characterizations,wehavetotakeamore3
subtle look at the allocations assigned by both solution concepts. Usually these allocations
are aggregated. But here we will consider non-aggregated allocations corresponding to
both solution concepts. This means that the payoff for each agent is decomposed into
payoffscorresponding to cooperation with agents separately. As a result, a non-aggregated
allocation is a matrix instead of a vector.
The paper is organized as follows. One machine sequencing situations are formally
described in section 2. We also recall the deﬁnitions of the aggregated EGS rule and the
aggregated split core and introduce their non-aggregated counterparts. In section 3 efﬁ-
ciency, symmetry and consistency are used to characterize the non-aggregated Equal Gain
Splitting rule and efﬁciency, consistency and converse consistency are used to characterize
the non-aggregated split core.
2 Sequencing and solution concepts
In a one machine sequencing situation a ﬁnite number of agents, each having one job, are
lined up in front of a single machine, waiting for their jobs to be processed. We denote
with N  IN the ﬁnite set of agents and n the number of agents. Further, we describe the
queue formed by the agents with a bijection  : N !f 1 ;2 ;:::;ng,w h e r e( i )denotes the
position of player i in thequeue. Particularly wedenote by 0 theinitial order of the agents
andwith N the set of all such bijections. Without loss of generality wemay assume that
0(i)=ifor all i 2 N. The processing time pi is the time the machine needs to process
the job of agenti. Finally we assume that agent i has an afﬁnecost functionci :I R +!IR +
deﬁned by ci(t)= it+ iwith i > 0 and i 2 IR +.S o c i ( t ) are the costs for agent i
when he spends t time units in the system.
A sequencing situation as above is denoted by (N;p;;0),w h e r eNIN, p =
( p i ) i 2 N 2 IR
n
+ ,  =(  i) i 2 N2IR
n
+ and 0 : N !f 1 ;2 ;:::;ng. The vector  =(  i) i 2 N2
IR
n
+ representing ﬁxed costs is omitted in the description of a sequencing situation since
these costs are independent of the positions of the agents in the queue. In the remainder we
denote withSEQthe set of all sequencing situationswith player set any ﬁnitesubset of the
natural numbers. For ease of notation an element of SEQis denoted with Γ(N),w h e r eN
is the set of agents.
Given the processing order of the jobs  : N !f 1 ;2 ;:::;ng the completion time of
job i equals C(;i)=
P
j:  ( j)   ( i )p jand the costs incurred by player i equal ci(C(;i)) =
iC(;i)+ i. By rearranging the agents the total costs can be reduced. Smith (1956)
showed that the total costs are minimal if the agents are placed in decreasing order with
respect to i=pi. In the remainder of this paper we call such a cost minimizing order an4
optimal order.













where gij(Γ(N)) = max(0;p i j −p j i)represents the gain agents i and j can obtain if
agent i is directly in front of agent j. An optimal order can be obtained from the initial
order by consecutive switches of neighbours i and j with gij(Γ(N)) > 0.T h eEGS rule
then divides thegain obtained with a neighbour switch equally among both agents involved
in theneighbourswitch. Notethat theEGS ruleonly assigns theﬁnal payoffto each agent.
So the allocation corresponding with the EGS rule is aggregated. Curiel et al. (1989)
showed that for every sequencing situation (N;p;;0) the EGS rule results in a core
allocation of the corresponding sequencing game.
Based on a generalization of the EGS rule Hamers et al. (1994) introduced the split
core of a sequencing game. The split core consists of all gain splitting allocations. One
obtains a gain splitting allocation by dividing the gain obtained with a neighbour switch
not equally but arbitrarily among the agents involved in the neighbour switch. Formally, a









(1 − ki)gki(Γ(N)) (1)




Hamers et al. (1994) showed that the split core is a subset of the core. Moreover, if
ij =1 = 2for all i;j 2 N we have GS(Γ(N)) = EGS(Γ(N)). Finally, note that the split
core is a set of aggregated allocations.
Example 2.1 Let N = f1;2;3g, p =( 1 ;1 ;1),  =( 1 ;2 ;4) and 0(i)=ifor all i 2 N:
It follows that g12(Γ(N)) = 1, g13(Γ(N)) = 3 and g23(Γ(N)) = 2 . Then GS
1(Γ(N)) =
12 +3  13, GS
2(Γ(N)) = (1 − 12)+2  23 and GS
3(Γ(N)) = 2(1 − 23)+3 ( 1− 13)
with 0  ij  1 for all i;j 2 N. In particular EGS(Γ(N)) = (2;3=2;5=2).
We will now deﬁne solution concepts on sequencing situations in a slightly different
manner. Instead of assigning an aggregated allocation of the total cost savings, we assign5
to each sequencing situation a non-aggregated allocation. In this context, non-aggregated
means that a speciﬁcation of the total reward an agent obtains is assigned to that agent.
Moreformally,anon-aggregatedsolution isamap assigning to each sequencing situation
Γ(N) 2 SEQ am a t r i xW 2IR
N  N
+ , where an element wij of W represents the non-
negative gain assigned to agent i for cooperating with agent j. The aggregated allocation
corresponding with a solution W can be found by multiplying W with the vector e =
(1;1;:::;1)> 2 IR
N . Now wecan deﬁne thenon-aggregated counterpartsof the Equal Gain
Splitting rule and the split core.
The non-aggregated Equal Gain splitting solution EGS assigns to each sequencing








2gij(Γ(N)); if 0(i)  0(j)
1
2gji(Γ(N)); if 0(i)  0(j)
for all i;j 2 N. Note that the allocation EGS(Γ(N))  e is equal to the equal gain splitting
allocation EGS(Γ(N)).
Example 2.2 Take the sequencing situation of example 2.1. The optimal order for this
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The non-aggregated split core SPC assigns to each sequencing situation Γ(N) 2
SEQ a non-empty subset SPC(Γ(N))  IR
N  N
+ such that for each gain splitting matrix
GS(Γ(N)) 2SPC (Γ(N))




gij(Γ(N)); if 0(i)  0(j)
gji(Γ(N)); if 0(i)  0(j)
for all i;j 2 N. An allocation corresponding with an element GS(Γ(N))) 2S P C (Γ(N))






GS(Γ(N)))ij=gij(Γ(N)); if 0(i) < 0( j )a n dg ij(Γ(N)) > 0
0; otherwise
for all i;j 2 N and substituting in expression (1). We conclude this section with another
example.6
Example 2.3 Take the sequencing situation of example 2.1. The optimal order for this
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Note that the set of allocations fW  ejW 2S P C (Γ(N))g coincides with the split core
SPC(Γ(N)).
3 Axiomatizations of the SPC and EGS solutions
In this section we characterize both the non-aggregated split core SPC and the non-
aggregatedEGSrule. Fortheseaxiomatizationsweneedthenotionsofconnectedcoalitions
and reduced sequencing situations. A coalition S is connected if for all i;j 2 S and all
k 2 N with0(i) < 0( k )< 0( j )it holds that k 2 S. The set of all non-emptyconnected
coalitions with respect to the initial processing order 0 is denoted with con(0).
A sequencing situation reduced to a connected coalition S is the sequencing situation
remaining when the agents outside coalition S are left out of consideration. The situation
which remains is described by Γ(NjS)=( S;pS; S;S
0)with pS =( p i) i 2 S; S =(  i) i 2 S
and S
0 2 S, where the latter is such that for all i;j 2 S it holds that S
0(i) < S
0( j )
whenever 0(i) < 0( j ) . We will clarify this with the following example.
Example 3.1 Take N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g;p=( 1 ;2 ;2 ;1 ;3);=( 1 ;1 ;3 ;2 ;7) and 0(i)=i
for all i 2 N: Note that the total cost savings are maximal when the jobs are processed in
the order 5,4,3,1,2. The coalition S = f2;3;4g is a connected coalition. This situation





Let   be a non-aggregatedsolution concept that assigns to eachΓ(N) 2 SEQam a t r i x
 (Γ(N)) 2 IR
N  N
+ and let ^  denote an optimal order for Γ(N). For the characterization
of the non-aggregated equal gain splitting solution EGS we introduce the following three
properties.

















(iii) Consistency: Let Γ(N) 2 SEQ. Then  iscalledconsistent ifforallΓ(N) 2 SEQ
and all S 2 con(0) it holds that  (Γ(N))jS =  (Γ(NjS)),w h e r e  (Γ(N))jS is the
matrix with all columns and rows of members outside S deleted.
Efﬁciencymeansthatexactlythemaximaltotalcost savingsisallocatedovertheagents.
Symmetry tells us that the gain two agents can obtain by cooperating is divided equally
among both of them. Consistency of a solution concept means that subcoalitions obtain
the same outcome if they renegotiate the (sub)solution on the basis of the same solution
concept to an intuitively appealing reduced situation To explain consistency more speciﬁc
for sequencing situations we use the following example, based on the situation described
in example 3.1.
In this situation we have N = f1;2;3;4;5g, p =( 1 ;2 ;2 ;1 ;3),  =( 1 ;1 ;3 ;2 ;7) and
0(i)=ifor all i 2 N. Next, consider the coalition S = f2;3;4g. The members of S
form a connected coalition. Hence, the agents in coalitionS can rearrangetheir processing
order without the cooperation of agents outside S. This problem can be considered as
a reduced sequencing situation (S;pS; S;S
0)with agents S = f2;3;4g, pS =( 2 ; 2 ; 1),
S =( 1 ;3 ;2) andS
0(i)=i−1foralli 2 S. Note,however,thattheagentsoutsideS have
not left the queue. But since all cost functions are afﬁne, the processing times of the agents
in front of coalition S do not inﬂuence the cooperation of coalition S. Hence, we may
consider theinitialorderS
0(i)=i−1 ;(foralli 2 S)in theabovereduced situationinstead
of the order S
0 = i; (for all i 2 S), which describes the real positions of the members of S
in the initial processing order 0. The allocation assigned by the non-aggregatedEGS rule
















Wewill nowshowthat forcoalitionS = f2;3;4gand thenon-aggregatedEGS solution
consistency is indeed satisﬁed in this example. For the situation with agent set N the non-






























The reduced matrix EGS(Γ(N))jS can then be found by deleting the columns and rows of
agents outside S of the matrix EGS(Γ(N)), that is deleting columns 1 and 5 and rows 1
and 5. The resulting matrix equals EGS(Γ(S)). Hence, the allocation of the gain obtained
by coalition S is not inﬂuenced by the agents 1 and 5.
Why only reductions to connected coalitions are considered is a result of the model
introduced in Curiel et al. (1989). In this paper the authors introduce cooperative games
which correspond with the sequencing situations described in section 2. In these games
twomembersof acoalitionS can only cooperateif theagentsstanding between themin the
processing order are also members of this coalition, that is, coalition S is connected. As a
consequence, connected coalitions are the only coalitions which have to be considered.
We will now state our characterization of the non-aggregated EGS solution.
Theorem 3.2 The EGS solution is the unique non-empty solution satisfying efﬁciency,
symmetry and consistency.
PROOF: First we will show that EGS satisﬁes these properties. ThereforeletΓ(N) 2 SEQ
be a sequencing situation and denote with ^  an optimal order for Γ(N). Symmetryfollows













Finally, for consistency it is again sufﬁcient to show that for all connected coalitions
S 2 con(^ )we have gij(Γ(NjS)) = gij(Γ(N)) for all i;j 2 S. This follows from the fact
that S
0(i) < S
0( j )if and only if 0(i) < 0( j )for all i;j 2 S and all S 2 con(^ ).
Thereversewillbeprovedwithinductiontothenumberofagents. Let  beanon-empty
solution concept satisfying symmetry, efﬁciency and consistency. If jNj =1efﬁciency
yields  (Γ(N)) = EGS(Γ(N)) = [0] for all Γ(N) 2 SEQ. Now assume that   = EGS
for all jNj <m .T a k ej N j=mand choose Γ(N) 2 SEQ. Reducing Γ(N) to S = f1g
and S = fng respectively, applying consistency and using the induction hypothesis yields





2gij(Γ(N)); if 0(i)  0(j)
1
2gji(Γ(N)); if 0(i)  0(j)
for all pairs (i;j) 6=( 1 ;n)and (i;j) 6=( n;1). Efﬁciency and symmetry then gives





2g1n(Γ(N)); if 0(1)  0(n)
1
2gn1(Γ(N)); if 0(1)  0(n)9
Hence,  (Γ(N)) = EGS(Γ(N)) for all Γ(N) 2 SEQ.
2
Beforeweturnto thecharacterizationofthenon-aggregatedsplit core,weshowthatthe
propertiesin theorem 3.2 are logicallyindependent. Firstconsider thesolution assigning to
each sequencing situation the null matrix. It is obvious that this solution is not efﬁcient but
satisﬁes symmetry and consistency. As we will showlater, anon-aggregatedGain Splitting
solution with ﬁxed fijgi;j2N satisﬁes efﬁciency and consistency but not necessarily sym-
metry. Finally, the solution concept assigning to each sequencing situation Γ(N) 2 SEQ








k;l2N gkl(Γ(N)) if i = j
0i f i 6 = j
(3)
satisﬁes efﬁciency and symmetry but violates consistency.
For the characterization of the non-aggregated split core, let   be a non-aggregated
solution concept that assigns to each Γ(N) 2 SEQ a non-empty subset of IR
N  N
+ and let
^  denote an optimal order for Γ(N). Consider the following three properties for  .










(ii) Consistency: LetΓ(N) 2 SEQ. Then  iscalledconsistentifforallΓ(N) 2 SEQ,
all S 2 con(0) and all W 2  (Γ(N)) it holds that WjS 2  (Γ(NjS)),w h e r eWj S
is the matrix W with all columns and rows of agents not in S deleted.









i2N ci(C(^ ;i)) the follow-
ing statement is true. If WjS 2  (Γ(NjS)) for all connected coalitions S 2 con(0)
then W 2  (Γ(N)).
The efﬁciency property states that exactly the maximal total cost savings are allocated
over the agents. For the multifunction case, consistency can also be seen as a stability
condition. To see this, consider again the situation described in example 3.1. Next, reduce
this sequencing situation to the connected coalition S = f2;3;4g. The non-aggregated









04  23 324
4(1 − 23)0  34








Although the allocations differ for the several choices of 23; 24; 34, the total which is
allocated to coalition S is constant and equal to 8. So a possible allocation GS(Γ(N)) 2
SPC(Γ(N)) will only be accepted by coalition S if the total cost savings assigned to the
agents of S for cooperating with membersof S is not less than 8. The consistency property
guarantees that coalition S gets exactly 8. Hence, coalition S will accept an allocation
satisfying consistency. For the split core this property is satisﬁed for coalition S in this
example. This can easily be checked by computing the total cost savings assigned by the
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00 4  23 324 1125
 13 4 23 0 34 535
 14 3 24  34 0 45















ij 2 [0;1];i ; j 2 N
  ij =1− ij;i ; j 2 N
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
and the total cost savings for coalition S equals
P
i;j2S GS(Γ(N))ij =8for all
GS(Γ(N)) 2SPC (Γ(N)).
So a consistent solution concept assigns to each connected coalition exactly the gain
this coalition can obtain in its reduced situation. Thus, consistency guarantees a form of
stability which differs from the stability guaranteed by the core of a cooperative game.
Because the core consists of allocations for which each coalition, connected or not, gets
at least the gain this coalition can obtain without the cooperation of agents outside this
coalition.
Finally,converseconsistencymeansthatwheneachallowedreducedmatrixofafeasible
matrix (that is, the maximal cost savings are allocated over the agents) is an element of the
solution of the corresponding reduced situation, then this gain splitting matrix must also be
an element of the solution of the non-reduced situation. Note that for sequencing situations
only reductions to connected coalitions are allowed.
With the three aforementioned properties we can characterize the non-aggregated split
core.
Theorem 3.3 The non-aggregated split core SPC is the unique non-empty solution satis-
fying efﬁciency, consistency and converse consistency.
PROOF: We will ﬁrst show that SPC satisﬁes all three properties. Therefore, let Γ(N) 2













Next, consider consistency. From the deﬁnition of the non-aggregated split core SPC,
it issufﬁcientto showthat forall connected coalitionsS 2 con(0)wehavegij(Γ(NjS)) =
gij(Γ(N))for alli;j 2 S. But thisfollowsfromS
0(i) < S
0( j )ifand only if0(i) < 0( j )
for all i;j 2 S and all S 2 con(0).








i2N ci(C(^ ;i)). Reducing the situation to S = f1g
and S = fng respectively and using WjS 2S P C (Γ(NjS)) and gij(Γ(NjS)) = gij(Γ(N))
for all i;j 2 S and all S 2 con(0) gives




gij(Γ(N)); if 0(i)  0(j)
gji(Γ(N)); if 0(i)  0(j)
for all pairs (i;j) 6=( 1 ;n)and (i;j) 6=( n;1). Efﬁciency then implies that




g1n(Γ(N)); if 0(1)  0(n)
gn1(Γ(N)); if 0(1)  0(n)
Hence, W 2SPC (Γ(N)).
So we are left to prove that if a non-empty solution satisﬁes these three axioms this
solution concept must be the split coreSPC. Therefore take a non-empty solution concept
  satisfying efﬁciency,consistency and converse consistency. We proveby inductionto the
number of agents that   = SPC.T a k ej N j=1and let Γ(N) 2 SEQ. Efﬁciency implies
that  (Γ(N)) = SPC(Γ(N)) = [0].S of o rj N j=1we have   = SPC.
Now suppose that   = SPC for jNj <m .T a k ej N j=mand let Γ(N) 2 SEQ.L e t
W2  (Γ(N)), then consistency of   implies that WjS 2  (Γ(NjS)) for all connected
coalitions S 2 con(0) with S 6= N. Using the induction hypothesis yields WjS 2
SPC(Γ(NjS)). Applying the converse consistency of SPC gives W 2S P C (Γ(N)).
Hence,  (Γ(N)) S P C (Γ(N)) for all Γ(N) 2 SEQ. Interchanging the roles of   and
SPC yields SPC(Γ(N))   (Γ(N)) for all Γ(N) 2 SEQ,s o =SPC, which proves
the result.
2
To conclude this paper we will show that these properties are logically independent.
As showed before, the set-valued solution fEGSg satisﬁes all properties but converse
consistency. The solution assigning to each sequencing situation the null matrix satisﬁes
both consistency properties but not efﬁciency. And ﬁnally, the solution concept deﬁned in
(3) satisﬁes efﬁciency and converse consistency and violates consistency.12
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